We examine how ownership concentration and the separation of ownership and control affect market liquidity in France. We find that firms with a large insider blockholder exhibit significantly lower liquidity. Different methods of concentrating control affect liquidity in different ways. Pyramid structures negatively affect liquidity for all pyramiding firms. Double voting right shares, a French specific means of control enhancement rewarding long-term shareholders, lead to increased liquidity for outside investors of small, familyfirms, by reducing the probability of informed trading. 
I. Introduction
Whether corporate governance affects market liquidity is a matter of much debate.
Market liquidity is a component of the transaction costs born by investors. Liquidity is also essential for arbitrageurs to keep share prices in equilibrium. Therefore, investors prefer to invest in liquid stock markets. The objective of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structures and corporate governance on market liquidity. We do so within the French institutional setting, which is characterized by firms with concentrated ownership. We pose three questions. First, to what extent does ownership concentration affect liquidity?
Second, is separation between control rights and cash-flow rights associated with lower liquidity? Third, do the devices used to enhance control (pyramid schemes, double voting right shares, voting caps…) have similar effects on liquidity?
It is generally believed that dispersed ownership leads to increased market liquidity (see for example Bolton and Von Tadden, 1998) . There are two potential explanations for the association between ownership structure and market liquidity. First, the trading or free-float hypothesis posits that the liquidity of a stock is increasing in the market capitalization of a firm. Average transactions costs depend on the number of shareholders participating in trade.
When a firm's ownership is concentrated, the free float is limited, there are fewer trade, and therefore the liquidity is decreased (Demsetz, 1968) . Moreover, ownership structure may affect liquidity through the production of information. According to Holmström and Tirole (1993) , concentrated ownership reduces the benefit of monitoring the firm by stock market participants, thereby reducing the amount of public information available about the firm. The number of market participants willing to invest in information acquisition in a firm is larger, the larger the anticipated gains from trade, which are directly related to the stock's free float.
The second explanation is the adverse selection hypothesis. Concentrated ownership is potentially costly, because blockholders may have private information about firm value. In response to a higher probability of informed trading, liquidity providers may widen spreads. A large body of theoretical work describes how markets react to the presence of informed traders (see for example Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . In practice, however, it is difficult to know which participants are informed and which are uninformed. According to the SEC, managers and controlling shareholders at the 10% threshold are classified as insiders.
Empirical studies frequently assume institutional investors to be informed. They have not access to private information, but may exploit economies of scale in information acquisition.
Most previous ownership-liquidity studies have taken into account institutional ownership. 1 However, as institutions prefer more liquid stocks, empirical investigations have to examine endogeneity between liquidity and institutional holdings. Rubin (2007) documents a high negative correlation between insiders' blockholdings and institutional holdings, confirming that institutions are more willing to invest in firms with less concentrated insider ownership.
Following the SEC definition of insiders, our study concentrates on manager and controlling shareholder ownership. Our choice is further motivated by the fact that insiders' blockholdings are on average very large in France (more than 50% according to our data) compared to 5.10% in the US (Rubin, 2007) .
Beyond the impact of concentrated ownership on liquidity, we also investigate the impact of separation between ultimate control and ownership on adverse selection and therefore on liquidity. Our analysis has two components. First, even if some degree of ownership concentration improves control of management, a larger deviation of control from ownership may be associated with a severe agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders. The incentives to extract private benefits are greater when not restrained by the controlling shareholder's own cash flow stake. Furthermore, the ultimate owner may choose a poor disclosure policy, worsening the information asymmetry problem, to trade on his private information. When the private benefits become a substantial share of the firm's value, minority shareholders may refuse to buy shares, leading to poorer market liquidity. Beny (2004) reports that weaker inside trading regimes have, at least, less liquid equity markets. Brockman and Chung (2003) show that Hong Kong based equities, operating in a good investor protection environment, exhibit narrower spreads than their low protected Chinabased counterparts. Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003) find differences in investor protection and corporate governance may help understand the U.S. investors' home bias. They report that the home bias is significantly smaller, but does not disappear, when controlling shareholders are taken into account. For example, the French market represents 2.96% of the world portfolio, 2.34% of the world float portfolio, but 0.65% of the U.S.
investors' portfolio. Keeping other factors constant, divergence of control from ownership should therefore result in a wider bid-ask spread and lower stock liquidity. More directly, using a Canadian sample of publicly-traded firms, Attig, Fong, Gadhoum and Lang (2006) find evidence that the bid-ask spread widens with the deviation between ultimate control and ownership.
Second, we investigate the impact on liquidity of how the firm chooses to enhance control. The two main ways to achieve separation of voting rights from cash flow rights are pyramiding and using different classes of shares that provide different voting rights for given cash flow rights. A pyramid structure allows indirect control of a firm by a chain of ownership relations using only a small cash flow stake. Through the use of different classes of shares, a controlling shareholder can achieve separation by directly owning the firm and selling shares with inferior or no voting rights. Both devices allow separation. However, with dual-class shares or equivalent mechanisms, the insiders hold superior voting right shares, and therefore, may not trade on inferior voting right shares. As a consequence, the probability for market participants to trade against insiders may be reduced, and the liquidity increased.
Our objective is to test the trading hypothesis and the adverse selection hypothesis, using a French sample of 1550 firm-year observations. The average French firm has concentrated ownership. French firms only rarely use dual-class shares. However, control is often enhanced via pyramid structures and double voting right shares, a specific French device that allows double voting rights for registered shares held for more than 2 to 4 years, depending on the firm's charter. Double voting rights are a means of rewarding long-term shareholders. The double voting right share loses its additional voting right when it is sold, and is negotiated like a single voting right share. The shareholders have to choose between the double voting rights and the liquidity of their shares.
First, we test for an association between float and several liquidity measures. In accordance with the trading hypothesis, we find a positive relation between float and liquidity. Second, we examine the impact of ultimate control rights. We find spreads increase and depths decrease in ultimate control. Third, we report that deviation of ultimate control from ownership has a positive impact on spreads. Fourth, contrary to the results in Attig et al (2006) , we find that the impact on spreads of deviation of control from ownership depends on the control enhancing device used by the firm. Pyramid structures have a positive impact on spreads as well as on the adverse selection component of the spread, whereas double voting right shares decrease spreads. Our results are consistent with the adverse selection hypothesis.
When the separation device used by the firm prevents insiders to trade on their private information, which is the case for double voting rights, it reduces information asymmetries and therefore the bid-ask spread. On the contrary, pyramid structures permit large divergence between control and ownership and do not prevent insiders to trade. They enhance information asymmetries and decrease liquidity. Whereas the negative impact of pyramids on liquidity prevails for all pyramiding firms, the positive effect of double voting rights is limited to small family-firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional and legal environment of the French firms' ownership and our hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe data. In Section 4, liquidity measures and methodology are developed.
In Section 5, empirical results are reported. Section 6 summarizes and provides conclusions.
II. Ownership structure on the French market and market liquidity II.1. The French institutional and legal environment
In France, as in most Western European countries, ownership tends to be concentrated. Faccio and Lang (2002) show that 36.93% of European firms are widely held, whereas in France this percentage decreases to 14%. 44.29% of European firms are controlled by a single family, versus 64.82% in France. Further, this concentration of ownership in France differs appreciably from that prevailing in the US. On average, Dennis and Weston (2001) report insiders own 9.79% of the U.S. firm's stock while institutions altogether own 31.06% of the firm's stock. In Heflin and Shaw (2000) , the mean total block ownership is 12.3% of shares outstanding.
Central to the question of governance is the way shareholder general meetings operate.
Under French law, there are two types of general meetings. Decisions by ordinary meetings, which approve the accounts, appoint and dismiss directors, and decide bond issues, require a majority of 50% of voting rights to be adopted. Decisions by extraordinary meetings pertain to all decisions amending the charter and issuing shares and require a two-thirds majority of voting rights. Therefore, three thresholds appear particularly important: the threshold of 33.33% (blocking minority), a threshold of 50% and a threshold of two thirds, which confers a super majority. However, in line with Faccio and Lang (2002) and earlier studies, we assume that 20 percent of the voting shares suffice to ensure control. If no shareholder exceeds the 20% threshold, then the firm is said to be "widely held", because in this case no one can unilaterally influence decisions without facing the opposition of other stockholders.
Following the literature (Faccio and Lang, 2002) , we take pyramiding into account to determine ultimate control rights. Firm A is said to be controlled through "pyramiding" if it has an ultimate owner, who controls B indirectly through another firm that it does not wholly control.
Apart from pyramids, the most common device to enhance control rights in France are double voting right shares. The firm's charter can authorise double voting rights for registered shares that have been held for more than x years (where x is between 2 and 4 years). In contrast to dual-class shares, the voting right is attached to the shareholder. If he decides to sell his share, the buyer will acquire a share with only one voting right. Double voting shares and single voting shares trade at the same price, unlike dual class shares. Typically, controlling shareholders own double vote shares while most minority shareholders own single vote shares. The double voting share structure has not been taken into account in previous studies examining the case of France (for instance, Faccio and Lang, 2002) .
Dual class shares were introduced in France in 1983 but are relatively rarely used.
They are restricted to shares with no voting rights.
In addition to different per share votes, the charter may also include voting caps, which limit voting rights in general shareholders' meetings to x% or a certain percentage of votes cast at the meeting. This means a shareholder can only use a certain percentage of his voting rights, and will only be able to use them all if he owns 2/3 of the capital.
Finally, some French companies are limited partnership firm. They have partners with unlimited liability who manage the firm, in addition to other shareholders. As the active partners' shares are non-transferable, and the charter makes removal of the managing partner practically impossible, use of this form of legal entity precludes hostile takeovers.
II.2. Hypotheses
We examine two main hypotheses on the relationship between ownership structure and market liquidity.
The free-float hypothesis
Ownership concentration leads to a dissociation between market capitalization and free float. Market capitalisation measures all shares of the firm, even those which may never be traded on the secondary market. In view of the concentrated ownership structures in the EU, free float is a better measure of the size of the market for the firm's shares. Indeed, in the presence of a large shareholder, only the shares included in the free float are likely to be traded. In continental European countries, the difference between capitalisation and free float is larger than in the UK or the US (see for example Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2003) . A large shareholder controlling a listed company takes into account private control benefits and therefore trades differently than small atomistic shareholders. Therefore, when a firm's ownership is concentrated, the availability of shares is limited, there are fewer shareholders who can participate in the trading of the stock and the frequency of trades is reduced. A small float discourages the acquisition and the production of information.
On the one hand the cost of acquisition of information probably increases and on the other hand the importance of transaction costs prevents the use of this information to generate profits. Therefore, the liquidity is decreased.
The adverse selection hypothesis
First, if large shareholders are more likely to be informed, their presence should increase the adverse selection discount associated with the trading of the stock, which implies a reduced liquidity. However, previous empirical studies, mainly conducted on US firms, lead to ambiguous results, partly because they do not distinguish between insider and institutional blockholdings. Heflin and Shaw (2000) report a positive association between spreads and block ownership (including insiders and institutional blocks). Sarin, Shastri and Shastri (2000) find that the spread is positively related to institutional ownership. Modelling the determinants of both ownership structure and spreads as a system of simultaneous equations, Dennis and Weston (2001) report that the spread is negatively related to both insider and institutional ownership, whereas Kini and Mian (1995) find no support for a significant relationship between spreads and blockholdings. Rubin (2007) reports that total institutional holdings as well as insiders' holdings have a negative effect on spreads, whereas institutional blockholdings have the opposite effect.
Evidence on the ownership-liquidity relation is rare outside the U.S. Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006) document that in Australia, director holdings of less than ten percent of issued capital enhance liquidity, whereas director holdings greater than ten percent reduce liquidity. Institutional ownership concentration has no impact on spreads. However, their database excludes issuer registered shareholdings, which represent about 50% of the ownership. They therefore exclude a large part of the insiders' holdings. Naes (2005) , for Norway, finds that block ownership leads to increased spreads but has no effect on depth.
Institutional blocks have no impact on liquidity.
In our study, we concentrate on controlling blockholders and examine their impact on liquidity. Therefore, we do not take into account institutional investors, except if they control the firm. We suppose that controlling owners are better informed than other investors and that bid-ask spreads are larger and depth is lower to reflect the high probability of informed trade.
Second, we examine the impact of divergence between control and ownership on liquidity. Following La Porta et al. (2000) , recent research demonstrates the importance of an economy's legal system on the quality of investor protection and the development and the liquidity of the financial markets. Several studies analyze the relation between investor protection and firm performance.
2 However, few papers examine the impact of investor protection on liquidity. Most papers examining the impact of ownership on liquidity are in a "one-share-one-vote" setting. However the separation of control and cash-flows rights can have several effects on market liquidity. First, control can generate private benefits for controlling shareholders. 3 In the presence of large private benefits, outside investors may not buy the stock, reducing the market liquidity. The ultimate owner may adopt a poor disclosure policy, to be able to trade on his private information. On the other hand, if a shareholder wishes to keep the control of a company, he will do it anyway. If he can use devices to enhance control, he will be able to hold a lower fraction of the shares to ensure control and float will therefore be more important, which has a positive impact on liquidity (see Becht, 1999) .
Empirical evidence on these effects is limited. According to Bhide (1993) , because of this information asymmetry, the spreads of closely-held firms are higher. Beny (2004) We can thus sum up our hypotheses:
H1. The liquidity of a closely-held firm stock is ceteris paribus lower because the float is smaller.
H2. The liquidity of a closely-held firm is lower because of a higher probability of informed trading, as blockholders may have access to private information.
H3. The impact of the separation of control from ownership depends on the device used by the firm. Separation through pyramiding should reduce liquidity whereas using double voting right shares, which deter informed trade, should increase liquidity.
III. Data

Euronext data
We use the Euronext intraday database. Our dataset contains a time-stamped record of all transactions and orders submitted to the market from July 1998 to July 2003 for all French listed firms (918). These data include transaction prices, volumes, and the best limits of the order book (bid and ask prices, and bid and ask size), as well as market capitalization. All data are stamped to the nearest second.
Euronext Paris is an electronic limit order market. There are two main market models:
continuous trading, for the more actively traded stocks, and a double auctions market for the less liquid stocks. A description can be found in Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999) . A call auction determines the opening and closing price in the continuous market. Trading takes place continuously from 9:00 to 17.25. 4 Traders mainly use limit orders and market orders.
Deferred settlement is possible for a subset of the more liquid shares: this market segment is called the "service à réglement différé" or SRD. For all other shares, only cash trading is possible. All SRD stocks belong to the continuous market. The SRD market segment accounts for approximately 89% of the total market value of Euronext Paris, and 97% of the turnover.
In several cases, we report results for subsamples by market (CAC40 index shares, non-CAC40 SRD shares, cash-only shares).
Euronext Paris offers substantial transparency. The five best bid/ask limits (price and quantity) in the order book are publicly released and members have access to all orders outstanding in the book, although the identity of the broker is not shown.
Traders can also submit iceberg orders (also referred to as hidden-size orders). For these orders, only specified tranches are successively entered in the order book, and disclosed to the market, with the current time stamp after full execution of the preceding tranche.
Ownership and governance data
There is no electronic database on French firm ownership, including relevant information on double voting rights and corporate governance characteristics. We manually collect this information from firm's annual reports for three years 1998, 2000 and 2002. The ownership structures are those available on the 31 st December of each year. Our sample includes all French listed firms, for which the annual reports are available. Table 1 reports characteristics for the 1550 firm-observations of our database and for subsamples by market.
[Insert Table 1 companies. The firms hold on average 0.96% of their own shares (1.87% for the CAC40 firms).
We also identified the ultimate controlling shareholders in the presence of pyramids, for a threshold of 20% of the voting rights, as in Faccio and Lang (2002) . On average, the largest shareholder holds 43.64% of the capital and 50.99% of the voting rights.
We further take into account the identity of the shareholders. In the family category firms are ultimately controlled by the French State. For the total sample, only 13.1% of the firms are widely-held, but this proportion amounts to 47.9% for the CAC40 companies and is reduced to 7.8% for the cash-only firms.
We then examine the methods used by the French firms to ensure separation between control rights and ownership rights held by large shareholders ( [Insert Table 2 We average all liquidity variables over 12 months around the date of ownership structure for each year (6 months before and after).
To complement the univariate analysis, we use several regression models using ordinary least square (OLS) to explain liquidity. Liquidity is the dependent variable represented by either relative spread or depth. We log-transform the variable depth because of skewness in its distribution. The independent variables include a set of corporate governance variables and a set of control variables. We introduce three control variables. The cost components of the bid-ask spread fall into three categories: order-processing costs, inventoryholding costs, and adverse selection costs. Order-processing costs are largely fixed. The bid-ask spread should therefore decrease with trading volume. A market maker incurs inventoryholding costs when providing liquidity. In an order-driven market, limit order traders run the risk of non-execution, and inventory costs grow as volatility rises. The bid-ask spread should therefore increase with volatility. Adverse selection costs result from the risk of trading with individuals who possess private information. Several measures of adverse selection costs have been used in the literature. The bid-ask spread should increase with volatility (Copeland and Galai (1983) ), while it should decrease with the size of the firm (market value of the shares) and the trading volume. 8 In order to take into consideration the combined effect of the control variables suggested by previous studies of the determinants of the bid-ask spread, we introduce market capitalization and SRD, a dummy which equals to one when the share is traded on the deferred settlement market. We also introduce a volatility variable (average of the standard deviation of rates of return over one year around the date of ownership structure). Year dummies are also included.
Among the corporate governance variables set, we take into account: the percentage of capital owned by the controlling shareholder and the second largest shareholder, the identity of the controlling shareholder, the wedge between cash flow rights and control rights, and dummy variables capting the presence of pyramids, double voting rights, voting caps, dual class shares and limited partnership.
V. Empirical results
Controlling shareholders and liquidity
We expect liquidity measures to be lower for firms with controlling shareholders than for widely held firms. Table 3 presents univariate evidence of market characteristics and liquidity measures by subsamples of widely-held firms, family-controlled firms and nonfamily-controlled firms. The sample is further broken down by settlement method (cash-only and deferred settlement) and inclusion/non inclusion in the CAC40 index for deferred settlement companies.
[Insert Table 3 here] Widely-held firms are the firms largest in market value, are more volatile, are involved in the most transactions, and are more liquid than family-controlled firms and non-family controlled firms. Their average market capitalization is €6,587.3 million, compared to €877 million (€3,401 million) for family-firms (non-family-controlled firms). The widely-held firms' turnover and number of transactions are significantly larger than the other controlled firms ones, which, in turn, are larger than the family-firms turnover and number of transactions. The average relative spread is 1.46% for widely-held firms, 2.99% for familyfirms, and 1.99% for non-family controlled firms. The average depth is 68,400 euros for widely-held firms, 24,800 for family-firms, and 61,200 for non-family controlled firms. The breakdown of the sample shows that the size and the volatility of companies listed on the same market segment exhibit only limited differences according to the existence of a controlling shareholder. However, family-firms are still characterized by wider spreads and lower depth. In general, the descriptive statistics indicate that the widely-held companies are the largest and the most liquid firms, whereas family-controlled companies are the smallest and less liquid firms. Non-family controlled companies fall between these two profiles.
To complement the univariate analysis, we use several regression models. We estimate all regressions using ordinary least square (OLS). We use either the relative effective spread or the depth as the dependent variable. Table 4 reports the estimation results. Liquidity, regardless of measure, increases with market capitalization, and is greater for firms on the SRD market. Liquidity decreases as volatility increases. This result is consistent with previous findings on the determinants of the bid-ask spread. Year-dummies are also included.
[Insert Table 4 here]
In the first column, we regress the spread on free float, and find a negative relationship. This result is consistent with the free-float/trading hypothesis. When the size of the market for the firm's shares is reduced, the frequency of trades and the production of information decrease and the liquidity is reduced. To test more directly the role of controlling shareholders on liquidity, in the second column we include two dummies for controlled firms.
The first (second) dummy equals one if the firm is controlled by a family (other controlling shareholder) at the 20% threshold. Spreads of family-firms (other controlled firms) shares are 4.37% (6.22%) larger on average than spreads of widely-held shares. We further include the percentage of capital held by the first and the second shareholders. We find the spread increases (and the depth decreases) with the percentage of the capital held by both the controlling and the second shareholder, confirming the free-float/trading hypothesis but also the adverse selection hypothesis if we suppose that controlling shareholders are informed traders.
We then investigate the impact of separation of ultimate control and ownership on liquidity. Discrepancy between cash flow rights and voting rights is equal to the ratio of voting rights minus cash flow rights to cash flow rights. We find the deviation of control from ownership to have a positive impact on spread and a negative but insignificant impact on depth. Several reasons may explain this result. First, when minority shareholders suspect private benefits to become a large part of the firm's value, they may prefer selling the shares or renounce to buy them. Second, the ultimate shareholder may choose to adopt a poor disclosure policy, to trade on his private information. Both will lead to lower liquidity.
Our results are robust when subsamples by control type are considered. The existence of a controlling shareholder at the 20% threshold reduces liquidity, whether he is a family or not. The second shareholder has a negative impact on liquidity for family-firms only. The deviation between ultimate control and ownership increases the spread for all the controlled firms, but the impact is more pronounced for family-firms. It does not affect depth. Orders may be posted in the order book in such manner to narrow the spread but with smaller quantities. One explanation is that in the presence of a large control-ownership deviation, most institutional investors do not invest. Thus, transactions are mainly initiated by individual investors, leading to smaller order size. However, as a fraction of these investors are informed, spreads increase. We therefore find evidence for our second hypothesis of reduced liquidity in the presence of controlling shareholders.
Means of enhancing control and market liquidity
French firms use two main devices to concentrate control, pyramids and double voting rights. We check whether these mechanisms have similar impacts on liquidity. Table 5 (panel A) reports the characteristics of firm-year observations using double voting rights compared to those without double voting rights. With respect to widely-held firms and non-familycontrolled firms, we find little difference in the univariate analysis between firms using double voting rights or not. On the contrary, for family-firms, the free float is significantly greater for firms using double voting rights (46.55% on average, compared to 35.45% for firms without double voting rights). This finding is consistent with the fact that families want to keep control anyway, and that the use of double voting rights allows them to increase the float of their companies for a given cash flow stake. Family-firms with double voting rights exhibit lower spreads (2.80% compared to 3.61% without double voting rights) and higher average depth (26,800 compared to 18,300). Table 5 , panel B, compares firms using double voting rights as a unique control enhancing device to firms with no control enhancing device.
The results are close to the previous ones: family-firms with double voting rights display larger free floats and reduced spreads.
[Insert Table 5 here] Table 5 , Panel C compares controlled firms using pyramids to controlled firms without pyramids. Pyramidal structures do not significantly affect the characteristics of non-familycontrolled firms. On the contrary, family-firms controlled by pyramiding are larger, have a larger free-float and a greater turnover. They exhibit higher liquidity: the average spread is 2.09% for pyramids compared to 3.12% for other firms and the median depth is 19,700 euros compared to 8,800 for other firms. Table 5 , Panel D compares firms using pyramids as a unique means of enhancing control to firms using no control enhancing device. The results are roughly the same as in Panel C. However, the finding of better liquidity for pyramiding firms is of limited interest in an univariate setting, as these firms display a much larger market capitalization, leading to increased liquidity.
We further examine the impact of different means of enhancing control by running regressions explaining our liquidity variables. Table 6 reports the regression coefficients for the total sample.
[Insert Table 6 here]
In the first set of regressions, we explain the spread by direct ownership variables (as opposed to ultimate ownership variables): percentage of capital owned by the main and the second shareholders, deviation between cash flow rights and control rights. The impact of the two direct ownership variables is similar to that of the ultimate ownership variables in Table   4 . However, the direct control/ownership deviation enters the regressions with a significant negative coefficient, whereas, in Table 4 , the ultimate deviation displays a positive coefficient. Double voting right shares are the main origin of direct deviation. Ultimate deviation is the consequence of both pyramiding and double voting rights. This finding may result from a different impact of these two means of enhancing control on liquidity.
To verify this hypothesis, the next regressions include dummies equal to one if the firm has adopted one of the following control enhancing mechanisms: pyramids, double voting rights, voting caps, dual class shares, and limited partnership. We find that double voting rights have a negative impact on spreads, whereas pyramiding leads to increased spreads. This result is robust to the inclusion of direct or ultimate ownership variables. It is also robust to the inclusion of a dummy for the identity of controlling shareholders. However, depth does not depend on the inclusion of double voting rights and pyramiding.
Dual class shares and limited partnership have no impact on liquidity measures.
Voting caps increase both spreads and depths.
Next, as family firms preferably use double voting rights, and other controlling shareholders pyramids, we investigate if the previous findings are invariant whatever the controlling shareholder identity. We run the previous set of regressions for subsamples by ownership structure type (Table 7) .
[Insert Table 7 here] For widely-held firms, double voting rights have no impact on liquidity. Voting caps increase spreads and depths. Most voting caps (63%) are adopted by CAC40 firms, which is the most liquid segment of the French market. When including in the regression a dummy that equals one if the firm belongs to the CAC40 index, the voting caps effects disappears. So, for widely held firms, liquidity is neither improved nor diminished by the adoption of any means of enhancing control.
For family-firms, we confirm that direct control/ownership deviation has a negative impact on spreads. Further, double voting rights decrease spreads and pyramiding increases spreads. For non-family-controlled firms, the spread does not depend on direct control/ownership deviation, neither on the double voting right dummy. However, pyramiding increases spreads.
Our results confirm that double voting rights may have a positive impact on liquidity for family-firms. This effect has two origins: first, the free float is larger for family-firms with double voting rights. Double voting rights permit family shareholders to ensure control by holding a lower fraction of the shares. As the negative impact of double voting rights is robust to including the variable float in the regressions, enlarging float is not the unique explanation for the positive impact of double voting rights on liquidity. The second reason results from a probable reduction of insider trading. Some informed shareholders will give up selling their shares, because if they did, they would lose their double voting rights. If a significant number of informed shareholders keep away from the market, the asymmetry of information may decrease, resulting in a greater liquidity. Double voting rights, by rewarding long-term shareholders, are also a way of enhancing liquidity for minority shareholders, in the context of small and closely-held firms. It may therefore be beneficial for both controlling and minority shareholders.
To check the robustness of our results, we verify them on a subsample of firms using double voting rights as a unique means of enhancing control and firms using no control enhancing device (Table 8 , Panel A). Again, we find that for family-firms, double voting rights have a negative impact on spreads and a positive but insignificant impact on depth.
Similarly, on a subsample with firms using pyramids and firms using no control enhancing device, we find that pyramids increase spreads for non-family-controlled firms (Table 8 , Panel B). Our results confirm therefore our third hypothesis that the impact of controlownership deviation on liquidity is positive for double voting rights and negative for pyramids.
[Insert Table 8 We use the Huang and Stoll (1997) The sample size for the adverse selection component of the spread (1087 firm-year observations) is therefore smaller than the sample size for spreads and depths (1550). Table 9 , Panel A, compares the characteristics of the firm-years for which the adverse component of the spread can be calculated and the other observations. The reduced sample contains 92.61% of the widely-firms, and only 64.18% of the family-firms. The firms in the reduced sample are characterized by a larger average market capitalization (2,878 millions euros compared to 97 for the non-included firms). The float is significantly larger (56.21% compared to 39.20%), the main ultimate shareholder holds 38.87% of the capital (54.87% for the non-included firms), and the average spread is 1.73% (4.70% for the non-included firms). In general, our reduced sample contains larger and more liquid firms than those of the initial sample.
[Insert Table 9 here]
We next run regressions to explain the adverse selection spread component to test the hypothesis that larger controlling shareholders and control-ownership deviation are associated with more serious information asymmetry (Table 9 , Panel B). We find that the adverse selection component of the spread is increasing with the ultimate and direct percentage of capital held by the main and the second shareholders, confirming that controlling shareholders are informed traders. The ultimate control/ownership deviation increases the adverse component of the spread, for the total sample and the subsamples of family and non familycontrolled firms. The pyramid dummy increases the asymmetric information for the total sample and the family-firms sample. When the controlling shareholder is able to trade on private information to extract private benefits, in particular by adopting a poor disclosure policy, the asymmetric information is higher. On the contrary, we can observe that neither the direct control-ownership deviation, resulting mainly from double voting rights, nor the double voting rights dummy, have a significant impact on the adverse selection component of spread Our previous results on double voting rights hold mainly for family-firms, which are on average smaller than other firms. We can see in Table 9 , panel A, that more than one-third of the family-firms are excluded in the calculation of the adverse selection component of the spread. The reduced sample containing mainly larger and more liquid firms, one interpretation could be that the impact of double voting rights on the degree of asymmetric information does exist for small and illiquid firms, for which we are unable to calculate the adverse selection spread component, but is unobservable for larger firms.
VI. Conclusion
Our study of the ownership-liquidity relation in France contributes to a wider understanding of the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms on market liquidity. We study a large sample of French firms by gathering hand collected data on control enhancing devices. French firms are characterized by concentrated ownership and a large use of double voting rights, a specific mechanism rewarding long-term shareholders. We find that liquidity is significantly reduced for closely-held firms, and this result is robust to measuring the controlling shareholding by direct or ultimate ownership, and to taking into account the identity of the controlling shareholder. The deviation between ultimate control and ownership increases the spread and its adverse selection component for all the controlled firms, but the impact is more pronounced for family-firms.
Pyramiding has a negative impact on spreads for all controlled firms. However, double voting rights are a liquidity enhancing device for family-firms. Double voting rights permit a larger free float for families that want to keep control and prevent informed shareholders from trading on private information. Overall, our study finds that for small family-firms, double voting right shares may be an enhancing control device that has positive consequences for minority shareholders in terms of the liquidity of their shares. (year-end 1998, 2000, 2002) . The sample is broken down into three subgroups according to settlement method (cash-only or deferred settlement) and inclusion/non-inclusion in the CAC40 index for deferred settlement companies. Ultimate ownership takes into account indirect control through pyramiding at the 20% threshold. Panel B presents the percentage of firms controlled by different ultimate controlling owners at the 20 percent threshold, and the mean percentage of capital and voting rights of the controlling owners.
Number of firm-years
All firm-years 1550
CAC40 shares 119
Other (year-end 1998, 2000, 2002) . Panel A reports the number (percentage) of firms adopting a given control device, the number of firms adopting pyramids and another device, and the number of firms using double voting rights and another device. In panel B, the sample is broken down into three subgroups according to settlement method (cash-only or deferred settlement) and inclusion/non-inclusion in the CAC40 index for deferred settlement companies. Panel C presents the control enhancement devices adopted by firms, by identity of controlling shareholders at the 20 percent threshold. This table contains 1550 firm-year observations. The sample is broken down by settlement method (cash-only or deferred settlement) and inclusion/non-inclusion in the CAC40 index for deferred settlement companies. The last columns provide parametric and non parametric tests to compare widely-held firms, family-controlled firms and nonfamily-controlled firms. The daily market value of the firm is averaged over 12 months around the date of availability of the ownership date (Year-end). Volatility is the annualized estimate of daily volatility. Turnover is the daily average. Spread is the daily average relative effective spread, estimated using full day data records. Depth is measured using the data closest to the opening of the trading day. All the variables are averaged over 12 months around the year-end.
Panel A. All shares
Widely-held N=203
Family-controlled N = 1086
Non-family-controlled N = 261 This table reports OLS regressions that relate liquidity to ownership and governance characteristics for our sample of 1550 firm-year observations. Liquidity is represented by either effective relative spread or depth for the firm-year. Spread is the daily average relative effective spread, estimated using full day data records. Depth is measured using the data closest to the opening of the trading day. Both variables are averaged over 12 months around the year end. Log (market value) is the logarithm of the daily market value of the firm, averaged over 12 months around the year end. Volatility is the annualized estimate of daily volatility averaged over the 12-months around the end of the year. SRD is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the share is eligible for trading with deferred settlement facilities, and zero otherwise. Regressions include year indicators. Other independent variables include free-float (at the 20% threshold) and ultimate cash-flow rights held by the largest and the second shareholder. Discrepancy between cash flow and control rights for the main shareholder is equal to the ratio of voting rights minus cash flow right to cash flow rights. Family control is a dummy equal to one when the main shareholder is an individual or a group of individuals. Non-family control is a dummy equal to one when the controlling shareholder is not a family. pvalues are in parentheses. Table 5 . Market characteristics according to the means of enhancing control by types of controlling owners Panel A reports the characteristics of firm-year observations using double voting rights compared to those without double voting rights. Panel B compares the characteristics of firm-year observations using double voting rights only compared to those using no control enhancing device. Panel C reports the characteristics of firm-year observations using pyramids compared to those without pyramids. Panel D compares the characteristics of firm-year observations using pyramids only compared to those using no control enhancing device. The daily market value of the firm is averaged over 12 months around the date of availability of the ownership date (Year-end). Volatility is the annualized estimate of daily volatility. Turnover is the daily average. Spread is the daily average relative effective spread, estimated using full day data records. Depth is measured using the data closest to the opening of the trading day. All the variables are averaged over 12 months around the year-end. The last columns provide parametric and non parametric tests to compare firms with and without double voting rights.
Panel A. Characteristics of the firms using double voting rights
Widely Spread is the daily average relative effective spread, estimated using full day data records. Depth is measured using the data closest to the opening of the trading day. Both variables are averaged over 12 months around the year end. Log (market value) is the logarithm of the daily market value of the firm, averaged over 12 months around the year end. Volatility is the annualized estimate of daily volatility averaged over the 12-months around the end of the year. SRD is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the share is eligible for trading with deferred settlement facilities, and zero Table 9 . Adverse selection component of spread Panel A reports the characteristics of firm-year observations, for which data were available to calculate the adverse selection component of spread, compared to the firm-year observations for which the data were unavailable. Panel B reports OLS regressions that relate the adverse selection component of spread to control variables and ownership and governance characteristics. The adverse selection spread component is calculated as in Huang and Stoll (1997) and averaged over 12 months around the year end. Log (market value) is the logarithm of the daily market value of the firm, averaged over 12 months around the year end. Volatility is the annualized estimate of daily volatility averaged over the 12-months around the end of the year. SRD is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the share is eligible for trading with deferred settlement facilities, and zero otherwise. Regressions include year indicators. Other independent variables are either ultimate or direct cash-flow rights held by the largest and the second shareholder. Discrepancy between cash flow and control rights for the main shareholder is equal to the ratio of voting rights minus cash flow right to cash flow rights. 
